Following the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) in 1993 and the Uruguay Round Agreement in \994. the United States appeared to be on the verge of an era of unprecedented trade liberalization. Since that time. however, the United States has struggled to pass almost every important trade liberalization bill. Results indicate that the factor most likely responsible for the dimculty in achieving trade liberalization over the lasl 15 years is shifting pressures within the U.s. House of Representatives related to partisanship and constituency.
I. Introduction
Following the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) in 1993 and the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1994, the United States appeared to be on the verge of an era of unprecedented trade liberalization. Since that time, however, the United States has struggled to pass (or failed to pass) important trade liberalization legislation involving, for example, fast -track autho rity. nonnalized trade relations with China, and freer trade in Central America and theCaribbean. More ominously, the current round of World Trade Organizat ion negotiations has also stalled, partly as a result of American intransigence on issues such as cotton subsidies and other farm support programs.
Why has it become so much more difficult to secure passage of legislation involving trade liberalization over the last 15 years? To identify the factors responsible for this shift I analyze three votes in the U.S. House of Representatives on bills that granted (or would have granted) the president fast-track authority. Attention is restricted to House votes on fast-track authority because trade liberalization has been much more contested in the House than in the U.S. Senate. The foc us is limited to the three votes involving fast-track authority because the o utcome of these votes parallels the larger shift in attitudes toward trade liberalization. Table I demonstrates this point. The table provides House VOle counts for the three fas ttrack bills considered. The first fast-track bill came to a vote in 1993 and passed by a large margin , receiving affinnative votes from a majority of both Republicans and Democrats. The second fa st-trnck bill came to a vote in 1998 and failed to pass by a sizable margin. Democrats overwhelmingly opposed the bill, which was also rejected by 71 Republicans. The last of the three fast-t rack bills came to a vote in 2001 and passed by a single vote. Again Democrats 21 -191 (9.9) overwhelmingly o pposed the bill, but Republican support for the bill was just great enough to secure its passage.
In order 10 explain fast-track voting swings and the larger shift in attitudes toward trade liberalization. I focus on changes in four different facto rs: campaign contributions, constituency, ideology, and partisanship. Each of these factors has received attention in the literature on fast-track authority, and I now brieny conside r each in turn. Devereaux , Lawrence, and Watkins (2006) and Chase and Kessler (200 1) argue that Democratic support for trade liberalization in the House fell during the 1990s because the Democratic Party became increasingly dependent on campaign cont ri butions from labor political action committees (PACs) during this period. After the loss of the Democratic majority in the House in 1994. business PACs redirected their contributions from Ho use Democrats to House Republicans. This shift in support increased the Democratic Party's reliance on labor contributions, making it less likely that House Democrats would support trade liberalization .
In contrast, both Con ley (1999) and Bardwell (2000) argue that "constituency pressures" in the aftermath of NAFTA led House members to view trade liberalization more negatively. They argue that the job losses and ot her adverse economic effects of NAFTA caused House members, and particularly House Democrats, to reassess their view of trade liberalization. According to Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins (2006) , many House Democrats also felt pressure to vote against fast-track authority in 1998 as a result of a well-coordi nated grassroots campaign on the part of o rganized labor.
In addition, ideological shifts, particula rl y in the Democratic Party, appear to have played an important role in shaping swing voti ng on fas t-track authority. Conley ( 1999) notes that the loss of southern Democratic moderates in the House in 1994, coupled with the election of more liberal northern Democrats in subsequent years, made passage o f fa st-t rack authority in 1998 and 200 1 much mo re difficult. Destler (2005) attributes this shift in part to what he calls activist "cause" groups, particularl y those that represent labor rights and the environment. These groups pushed hard for the inclusion of labor and environmental standards in the 1998 and 2001 fast-track bills, and many House Democrats became increasingly sympathetic with this position.
Destler (2005) a lso argues that partisanship played a sign ificant role in the 1998 and 2001 House votes on fas t-track authority. He notes that the change in the House majority in 1994 brought in new Republican leadership that focused more on results than bipartisanship. This trend was strengthened further after shifts in the House Republican leadership in 1998 and 2000. Magee (2010) argues that the shift in the party of the president in 2000 increased the likelihood that House Republicans would support fa st-track authority in 200 I. In part this was because Republican control of the presidency gave the Republican Party greater control over the content o f any fa st-t rack bill. The fact that the new president represented the majority party in the House also increased the leverage of the White House in drumming up support for fasttrack authority.
The goal of this article is to determine the importance of these different factors in explaining the shift in House sentiment toward trade liberalization over the last two decades. The article assesses the importance of these factors using roll call votes on three trade bills. all of which involved fast-track authority. Because the study examines the votes of legislators on the same issue over time. it is possible to identify the facto rs that caused legislators to shift their votes.
Background
Fast-track authority was first gr:mted to the president by the U.S. Congress in the Trade Act of 1974. Under fa st-track authority. Congress has 60 days from the subm ission of a trade agreement to vote on the agreement li S negotiated; amendmen ts are not penn itted. The goals of fast-track authority are twofold: first. to ensure timely Congressional action on any negotiated agreements. lind second . to prevent Congress from unraveling trade agreements through amendments. Without fast-track authority. fewer countries would be willing to negotia te trade agreements with the United States b<x:ause agreements negotiated by the president could subscquent ly be picked apart by Congress prior to congressional ratification . Because of this. labor interests. which generally oppose freer trade. have typically opposed fast-track authority as well. while business interests. which generally favor freer trade. hllve typically suppo rted il.
After fast-track authority WllS first granted to the president in 1974. Congress opted to renew it in 1979 and again in 1988. The three bills analyzed in this article address th ree House actions to renew fast-track authority since 1988. The first lIction occurred o n J une 22. 1993. when the House approved House Resolution (HR) 1876 by a vote of 295 to 126. HR 1876 extended fast-track authority until April 15. 1994. bUI only for the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GAIT) negotiations. Without this extension, the U.S. negotiating position would ha ve been jcop'lrdized. threatening the entire GAIT agreement. Recognizing this. Congress used the relatively narrow window provided by the extension to put pressure o n its negotiating pll rtners.
Because HR 1876 extended fast-t rack authority only for the Uruguay rou nd of GATT negotiations. President Bill Clinton sought II full extension of fast-tfllck authority lifter these negotiations were successfully completed . His attempts to extend fast-track authority ended in failure on September 25.1998. when the House defeated HR 2621 by a vote of 180 to 243. This vote marked the first time that any president had been denied fllst-track authority. Opposition to the bill came primarily from Democrats. but the failure of the bill can also be attributed to the Republican House leadership. which deliberately brought the bill to a vote shortly before the 1998 congressiona l elcct ions despite the reluctance of the president and Ho use Democrats.
When The first stllge of the Grossman and Hdpman (1994) model focuses on the mo tive fo r PAC cont ributions. arguing that the pu rpose of these contributions is to innuence legislator votes. According to this modeL the legislators most susceptible to influence represent districts in which the social cost o f deviating from their constituents' optimal trade policy is relatively sma ll. Becnuse the social cost of voting against their o wn constituents' interest is relatively small in such districts. the supply price of the legislators who represent these districts will also be relatively small. making them less expensive for special interests to target. Strattmllll (1992) identifies'l second group of legislators who are ,Ilso more li kely to be targeted by special interest gro ups. Hc argues that lcgislators who are closer to the median position of the legislature arc more likely to receive contributions than those who are further away. If the goal of a special interest is to buy votes. it makes litt le sense to target legislators who al ready intend to vote the position supported by a special interest. It also makcs little sense to contribute to the campaigns of legislators who arc st rongly o pposed to the special interes!'s position. Even if the votes of these legislators could be altered. their supply price would be very high. T hus specia l interests arc more likely to target legislators with moder:l1e views because the supply prices of sueh legislators arc lower given the uncertainty of their positions.
[n the second stage of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model. legislators vote for the trade policy thit! maximizes their obje<:tive funct ion. The model implies that the impact of c'lmpaign contributions on a legislator's vote depends at least in part on the legislator'S own preferences (which shape the Icgishllor's assessment of the trade-off between campllign contributions and social welfare), o n the impllct that cmnpaign cont ributions have on a legislator's probabilit y of being reelected. and o n the chllracteristics of the legislator's constituency (which determines the impact of any pllrticulllr policy on a legislator's constituents). Any assessment of the relationship between campaign contributions and legislator votes must therefore control for these factors. Grossman and Hclpnmn (1996) allow fo r the possibilily that campllign contributions may be extended in an anempt to affe<:t electoral o utco mes. Here, contributions do not affe<:1 a legislator's policy stance but rather the probability th.1I a legislator with a given policy stance will be elected. T his possibility complicates the empirical analysis because it implies that campaign contributions may be endogenously determined by a candidate's position on issues such as fast-track authority. I f th is is the case. simult'lIleity bias will exist. requiring some form of correction.
4, Econometric Analysis and Data
The econometric model employed is a simple logit model that uses instrumental variables to control for the potential endogenei ty of campaign cont ribut ions. The dependent variable is a dummy varia ble tholt takes a value of one if a House member votes in favor of fast-track autho rity and a value of zero o therwise. The independent variables include measures of ideology, constituency. campaign contributio ns. and partisanship. Each of these measures is now considered in greater detail.
To control for ideology. I use OW NOMI NATE scores (Poole and Rosen thal 199 1). OW NOM INATE is a spatial measure of ideology that has two different dimensions and is calculated using roll call votes from the 1st through the II Oth Congress. The first dimension renects a member's posi tion o n the conservative-liberal spectrum, with more negative scores indicating more liberal preferences and more positive scores indicating more conservat ive preferences. The second dimensio n renects a member's position on slavery or civil rights. Poole a nd Rosent hal (1991) show that only the first dimension is rclevant over the last two decades. so I use only this d imension in the analysis and hypothesize that it is positively correlated with the dependent variable.
Three characteristics of each congressional district are used to capture the effect of constituency. The first characteristic is the percentage of II district's population over age 25 without a high school degree. which is a measure of the skills possessed by a district's wo rkforce. Given the relative scarcity of unskilled labor in the United States, the StolperSamuelson theorem predicts that this characteristic should be negatively correlated with a member's trade vote. The second characteristic is the ratio of district employment in export industries to district em ployment in import ind ustries. This variable, which was obtained from Baldwin and Magee (2000) . is hypot hesized to be positively related to the dependent variable. The third characteristic is the unionizat io n rate within each congressional district. as estimated by Box-Steffenmeier. Arnold . and Zorn (1997) . I hypothesize that this characteristic will be negat ively related to the dependent variable. The two campaign cont ribution variables used in the study measure contributions received by members fro m business and labor PACs. Since business groups in the United States are more supportive of free trade than is orglmizcd labor, cOlll ribu\ions from business PAC5 arc hy pothesized to increase the probability that a member supports free trade. while contribu tions from labor PACs arc hypothesized to decrease this probability. Note that all of the analysis \Vas conducted using campaign cont ributions from the current and prior election cycle. Like Stratmann (1995) . however. I find that campaign contributions from the current election cycle dominate those from the prior cycle. As a result. I report on ly the results fo r contributions fro m the current election cycle.
To con trol for the likely endogeneity of campaign contributions. I use instrumental variables to identify the component of a legislator's campaign contribut ions intended to innuence his or her vole. Ideally. each instrument should be uncorrelated with a legislator's vote but correlated with cam paign cont ributions. Conventional inst ruments (Ansolabeherc. Figueiredo. and Snyder 2003) inelude membership o n innuential committees. leadership positions o n committees or within the party, and the degree of electoral competition facing a candidate. J use dummy variables to capture membership o n the Ways and Means. Finance, and Energy and Commerce committees. Members of these committees arc singled out beca use they receive higher levels of campaign contributions in general than members of o ther Ho use committees. I use a trichotomous vil riable to identify committee leadershi p. with a vH lue of two assigned to the committee chair. a value of o ne assigned to the minority rank ing member. a nd a value of zero assigned to all o ther members. A dummy variable is used to identify party leaders. with ,I value of one assigned to the House speaker. the majority and mino rity leaders, the majority and minority whips. and the caucus or conference cha irs and a value o f zero assigned to all other members. The degree o f electoral competition within a member's district is captured by the percentage of the vote a member receives as well as the o pponent 's campaign spend ing.
In addition to these instruments, I use two ot her instruments: a member's pa rty unity score and the absolute deviation from the mean of the percentage o f a district's vote fo r the Democra tic presidential candidate in the previous election cycle. A member's pa rty unity score gives the percentage of votes the member casts with his o r her party in votes when at least 50% of Democrats vote against at least 50% of Republicllns. Pa rty unity scores vary fro m 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating greater support for the party position. Party un ity scores a re a useful instrument here because they measure how independent legislators lire and hence how open they may be to external inO uence. Note that these scores should not be correlated with a member's fast-track vote because higher scores indicate greater party support whether a legislator is a Democrat or a Republiciln. I use the absolute deviat ion o f the percentage o f the dist rict vote for the Democratic presidential candidate from its mean beca use th is provides a measu re of the electoral cost of shifting votes. In geneml. the smaller the absol ute deviation from the mean, the mo re moderate is the dist rict and the lower is the electoral cost to a legislator of shifting his o r her vote. Notice that beca use I use the absolute deviation from the mean , this deviat ion should not be correlated wi th the probability that a legisla tor votes fo r fa st-track authority.
The last two independent variables ineluded in the simple logit analysis are dummy variables that attempt to capture the eITect of partisanship. T he ti rst dummy variable equals one if a House member's party is the smne as the president's party and eqll<lls zero otherwise. Magee (2010) shows that when a member's party lIffili,lIion is the same as the president 's, the member is more inclined to support the president's position. Because both Presidents Bush and Clinton were supportive of trade liberaliza tion. this dummy variable is hypot hesized to be positively correlated with a member's fast-track vote. T he second dummy takes a value of one if the bill under co nsideratio n cume to a vote after 1994 and eq uals zero otherwise. Because the 1994 ch,mge in party leadership in the House marked the beginning of an enl of increased partisa nship. I expect that moderate Democrats who might have supported fast-track autho rity prior to 1994 felt less inclined to do so after 1994. T hus I expect the coefficient on the second dummy to be negative.
T he data used in the study come from a va riety of sources. Campaign contributions from business and labor PACs, voting shares, and opponent ca mpll ign spending were all taken rrom data provided by the Center for Responsive Politics, either through its Web site (www. opensccrets.org) o r thro ugh its publications (Makinson and Goldstein 1994) . Roll ca ll votes on the three fast-track bills were ta ken fro m Congressional QU(lf/erly Weekly while membership on the Ways li nd Means, Finance, and Energy a nd Commerce committees as well as party leadership were o btained from the Congressional Quarterly Almal/ac. T he share of a district's vote for the Democratic presidential ca ndidate was taken fro m Polit/aw Demographic and Polilical Gui(Ies (http://www.polidata.us). The ratio of jobs in export industries to jobs in import industries was obtained from Baldwin and Magee (2000) , while data from the 1990 U.S. Census were used to obtain the pcrcenlUge of the populat ion age 25 o r over without a high 
Results
Before discussing the logit results, consider first Tables 2 and 3 , which examine the nature o f swing voting on the three fast-track bills. T able 2 decomposes swing votes o n these bills into swing votes involving incumbents and swing votes involving congressional turnover. The table shows that incumbent vote swings accounted for slightly more than half of all vote swings between the 1993 and 1998 bills. Of the 7S Democratic and Re publican incumbents who al tered their fast-track votes on the two bills. 73 shifted their votes against fast-track authority while 2 shifted their votes in favo r, for a net loss o f 71 votes. Note that vote shifts are not related to party, with both Democratic and Republican incumbents moving al most unanimously against fast-t rack authority. Of the 70 vote shifts involving turnover, S6 involved a shift against fasttrack authority while 14 involved a shift in favor. for a net loss of 42 votes. Note that whi le newly elected RepUblicans were more likely than newly elected Democrats to support fast-track authority, a clear majority of both groups o pposed fast-track authority.
In con trast, swing voting between the 1998 and 200 1 bills break almost enti rely along partisan lines. Of the 30 Republican incumbents who shifted their votes o n the two bills, all but one moved to support fast-track authority, Conversely, of the 16 Democratic incumbents who shifted their votes, all but two moved to oppose fast-trac k authority. The turnover vote swings are equally partisan, with all 20 newly elected Republicans supporting faSl-lrack authority and 9 of II newly elected Democrats opposing it. Table 3 provides data on the representatives of the congressional districts in which swing voting occurred. The table includes districts in which incumbents shifted their fast-track votes as well as districts in which vote shifts were accompanied by turnover. T he upper portion of the table focuses o n vote swings between the 1993 and 1998 bills while the lower portion focuses on swings between the 1998 and 200 1 bills. T he data focus o n the ideological position and degree of partisanship of each district 's represematives as well as the share o f their PAC contributions from organized labor. Consider first vote swings between the 1993 and 1998 rast-track bills. or the districts whosc represcntatives shiftcd votes rrom yea to nay. the most notable result is the increilse in the share of PAC contributions received rrom organized labor. Both the mcan and median labor contribution shares increilsc. and the incrcilsc in the mean share is statistically significant at the 5% level. T his result is consistent with the view thilt organized labor played a significant role in the dercilt or the 1998 rast-tmck bill. Of the districts whosc representiltives swi tched votes rrom nay to yea, the most notable result is the increasc in DW NOM INATE scores. 80 th the mean and mediiln DW NOM INATE scores increilSC. and the increase in the mean is statistically significant at the I % level. This result reflects the ract that most o r the districts whosc representatives shined votes rrom nay 10 yea also saw the replacement or Democratic representatives by Republican representatives between the 1993 and 1998 ras t-track votcs. This ract is also apparcnt in the mean and median labor cont ribution shares. both or which decline significantly between the two votes.
Consider next vote swings between the 1998 and 2001 rast-track bills. or the districts whose representatives shifted votes rro m yea to nay, the two most notable results are the decline in DW NOMINAT E and the increase in the share or PAC cont ributions received rro m o rgan ized labor. The changes in the means and medians or both variables are large. and the changes in both means arc also statistically significant at the 1% level. These two results suggest that vote shirts that went against the 2001 rast-track bill were motivated by ideological change (due almost entirely to turnover) and the influence or organized labor. Vote sh irts in ravor or the 2001 bill also appear to be ideologically driven, as is demonst rated by the large and statistically significant increase in the meiln of DW NOM INATE (again, due almost entirely to turnover). Notice also the increase in the mean and median or the party unity score. the fo rmer or which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The increase in the party unity score is consistent wi th the argument that partisanship was at least partly responsible ror the success or the 2001 bill. Table 4 gives the logit results when instrumental variables a rc used to control for the potential endogeneity of campaign contributions. The first three columns o r Table 4 show the results when votes are pooled across the three rast-track bills while the last three columns show the results when each bill is considered separately. Consider the pooled results first. The first specificati on in Table 4 uses the full sample whi le the second and third specifications break out the sample by party affiliation . The signs or the coefficients in each specification are as hypothesized and. with a few exceptions. are also statistically significant at conventional levels. From this it rollows that ractors related to ideology. constituency. campa ign finance. and partisanship do indeed impact fast-track votes.
To determine the re1:lIive importance or these facto rs, Table 4 includes the marginal effect or each independent variable. To compute an independent variable's marginal effect, the p:lTlial derivative of the likelihood funct ion with respect to that variable is multiplied by the variable's standard deviation. As a result. each murginal effect gives the change in the probability o r an affirmative vote ror a one standard deviation change in one o r the independent varia bles. The marginal effects ror the first three specifications show that the relative importance or the independent variables differs and that these differences vary by political party. Overall. the marginal effects indicate that ideology has the most powerrul effect on rast-track votes but that this effect is st ronger ror Democrats than ror Republicans. This is not en tirely unexpected given the ract that the ex treme nationalistic rringe of the Republican Party has o rten voted against james M. De Valill trade liberalization. The presence of this fringe implies that the relationship between ideology and suppor! fo r trade liberalization is more tenuous for Republicans than for Democrats. Of the three factors related to consti tuency, the educational attai nment measure a ppears to be the most important overall, with a marginal effect that is at least 50% greater than that of the o ther two constituency variables. If we focus just on House Democrats, the unionization rate has the largest marginal effect while employment in trade-related industries has the smallest. Not surprisingly, this result does not hold for House Republicans, who place much greater weight on educational attainment and employment in trade-related industries than on the unionization rate.
Of the two contribution variables. business contributions clearly have a more significant impact on votes than do labor contributions. T he marginal effect of business contribution is larger, regard less o f party affiliation, and the coefficients o n the labor contribution variable are statistically insignificant in two of the three models. These results suggest that labor contributions are given not to influence legislator votes but rather to influence somet hing else, such as electoral o utcomes.
The two dummy variables also have substantial marginal effects, particularly the post-1993 dummy variable. The statistical significance of the coefficient on this dummy variable, when combined with the relatively large marginal effect. suggests that a shift occu rred in the post-I993 environment that reduced the likelihood that House members of either party would support fast-track authority. Th is shift had a greater im pact o n Democrats than o n Republ icans and may be related to the more partisan atmosphere that existed in the House after the cha nge in the House majority pa rty in 1994. Alternatively, the shift could be related to the implementation of NAFfA in 1994. The presidential party dummy also has a sizable ma rginal effect. which indica tes that partisanship played an important role in determining votes on fast-t rack authority.
Consider next the las\ three columns o f Table 4 , which presen t the instrumental variable logit res ults when the three fa st-track votes are estimated separately. Examining the votes sepa rately makes sense here because thcre is reason to believe that House members shifted the priority they placed on different criterill during the sample period. If this is the case, the coefficients and marginal effects wi ll be changing over time. Such a shift is readily apparent in Table 4 . For example. the coefficient on OW NOM INATE more than doubles between the 1993 vote and the 200 1 vote while the marginal effect of this variable more than quadruples. These changes imply that House members placed increasing emphasis o n ideology as the fa sttrack votes unfolded . perhaps as a result of a more partisan atmosphere in Congress. Note a lso that bot h the coefficient on the unionization rate and the margi nal effect of unionization double between the 1993 and 1998 votes, although they decline thereafter. These changes support the argument that after the implementation of NAFTA, organized labor was able to shift the terms of the debate over fast-track a uthority to its adva ntage. In contrast, the coefficient on the educatio nal attainment measure changes little, although its marginal effect does increase somewhat between the 1993 and 1998 votes.
In o rder to better understand how changes in the independent variables (or the importance attached to them) affected voting on the three fast-track bills. a series of simulations is conducted. The first set of simulat ions uses the first specification in Table 4 10 estimate the impact of changes in the independent variilbles on roll call votes. Before examining the res ults, it is important to note that because the three constituency variables arc all time invariant, it is not possible to simulate the impact of cha nges in constituency o n fast-t rack votes. Having said this, it is worth pointing oUI that the three constituency facto rs used here are not likely to change dramatically over the eight-year period in which the three votes occu rred. As a consequence, it is unlikely that changes in constituency played a major role in swing voting on the three fast-t rack bills. Table 5 presents the first set of si mulation results. The simulated vote changes for each independent variable arc obta ined in two steps: in the in it illl step. the independent va riable is set to its value in the current fast-track vote. the pro bability o f an affimmtive vote is calculated fo r each representative. and the probabilities are then summed across all representat ives. T his sum provides an estimate of the number of affirmative votes cast given the current value of the independent variable. In the next step, the independent varillble is set 10 its val ue in the prio r fast-track vote. the probability of an affirm at ive vote is recalculated fo r each rep resentative, and the probabilities lire once again summed across all representatives. This sum provides an estima te of the number of affirmati ve votes cast when the current value o f the independent • Note lhal the number of observations ;1) the sample is less thiln the number of vot~'S actUltlly C;IS! because of the presence or missing data.
variable is replaced with its prior value. The difference between these IWO sums provides an estinHtte of the number of vOles affected by a change in a partieul:lr independent vll riable.
T able 5 shows that the simulated effect of changes in the independent va riables on Ihe 1998 fas t-track vote is negligible. except for the 1993 dummy, which has a powerful em.:ct on the linal outcome. Without the change in the 1993 dummy, the number of affi rmative votes would have inereascd by 86. enough to reve rse Ihe outeome of the 1998 fast-track vote. at least within Ihe slImple for which the re are complete da ta. As noted earlier, Ihis du mmy may capture the effect of pa rtisanship, the effect of the implementation o f NAFTA. o r both. Surprisi ngly.
the effects of changes in ideology arc small and yield only a modest increase of four aflirmalive votes. ChlUlges in ei ther business or labor contribulion have no effect on the number of IIffirmative votes CIlSt. Note thllt because the party of the president did not c hange between the 1993 lind 1998 votes, the presidential party dummy does not change and hence has no impact o n the 1998 vOle. In contriLst, the 2001 vote appears \0 have been most signilicanlly affected by thc c hange in the party of the president. If this party had not c ha nged, the number of affirmative votes would have been reduced by nine. Withou t c h:tnges in the rcst of the independent variables, the number of affirmative votes would also have been reduced. but by much smaller numbers. Combined . the c hanges in all the independent va riables are estimated to have increllsed the number of affirmative votes by 20.
T o get a sense of how c ha nges in the relative importance of the indepe ndent variables mighl have affected the outcomes of the 1998 and 2001 fa SH rac k bills. a seeond SCI of si mulations is conducted and the results a re prescn ted in T able 6. These simulations are conducted in a similar manner except th:1t instead of replacing an independent variable with its prio r value. each statistically significant coefficienl in the fifth and sixth specilicll tions in T able 4 is replaced with its value from the prior regression. A s before, two sums are calculated. but now the first sum gives the sim ulated number of affi rmative votes given the cu rrent v:tlue of a coefficient and the second sum gives the sim ulated number of affi rmative votes give n the prior value of the same coefficient. The difference between these two sums is a measure of how shifting congressional priorities affected the 1998 and 2001 fast-tTllck votes. Table 6 shows lirst thaI without the increased emphasis on ideology in the run-up 10 both the 1998 and 2001 VOles, the number of amnnativc votes would have decreased by seven and nine. respectively. In contrast. c hanging priorities related to constituency significant ly reduced The effect of constituency is harder to identify. mainly because the available measures of constituency arc time invariant at the district level. What is clear from the regression results is that fac tors related to constituency arc important detenninants of fast-track votes. T he measures rclated to constituency have the hypothcsized clTcct on niSI-track voles. and the size of the marginal elTecls supports the view that constitucncy played an importan t rolc in fasttrack voti ng. Because Ihe measures of constituency are time invariant. however, it is impossible to determine whet her changes in fact ors related to constituency drove changes in fast-track voting. Nonetheless, it is apparent from the analysis Ihat House members placed grealer priority on factors related to constituency after the 1993 vote and tha t th is shi ft in emphasis contributed signi fi cantly to the defe.1I of the 1998 fast-track bilL Somewhat surp risingly. the role of ideology in explaining sh ifts in fast-track voti ng appears to be minimaL While the coefficients a re correctly signed and significant. and while the marginal elTeets are sizablc, thc computed elTeets of ideological change are small and canno t explain the larger shift in sentiment against trade liberalization. T his is most likely because turnover within the Democratic Party that strengthened opposition to tmde liberalization in the aftermath of NAFTA was olTset by the loss of the Democratic majo rity in the Ho use in 1994. If this is indeed the case. the current Democratic majo rity in the House may pose a significant obstacle to new attempts to liberalize trade.
The role of partisanship is unclea r. Perhaps the strongest result in the article is the clTcct o f the post-1993 dummy variable, which by itself is cilsi ly great enough to account for the substantial defeat of the 1998 fast-track vote. This dummy variable may renect the more partisan atmosphere that prevailed in the House after the Republic,lns won a majo ri ty in the 1994 election . It is possible that in this more partisan environment, Democratic moderates who had previously supported the 1993 fast-track bill shifted thei r position on fast-track authority. It is also possible. however. that the eITeet of this dummy variable reneets a change in sentiment toward trade liberaliz.1tion resulting from the implementation of NAFTA. Superficially. increasi ng partisa nship seems to largely explain the shift in votes between the 1998 and 2001 fast-track bills. The estimates fro m the article suggest. however. that the net cha nge in votes auributable to the change in the party of the president was relatively small and certain ly not great enough to account for the passage of the 2001 fast-t rack bilL Of course, the partisan naturc of the votc could also have been driven by the change in Ho use leadership in 2000. There is some evidence for this position in that the importance of ideology does appear to incrcase over the period in which the three votes were cast. To the extent that th is increase reneets party polarization, partisanship plays a greOller role than the simple presidential dummy suggests.
